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  21. Climate change and development 
 
 
Climate change is happening and the diversity of impacts is likely to most affect the 
poor in developing countries.  Developing countries are particularly vulnerable 
because they have some of the most climate-sensitive economies and concentrations 
of urban poor
1.  These societies may have a limited capacity to adapt to change
2.  
Subsistence societies are largely dependent on natural resources, which are affected 
directly by climate variability and change
3.  Interrelated drivers of vulnerability also 
include a reliance on the informal sector, limited formal safety nets, weak 
infrastructure and healthcare, frequent disasters, environmental degradation and 
poverty.  
 
Climate change will compound existing vulnerabilities and has implications for 
poverty eradication and therefore the ability of countries to meet their Millennium 
Development Goals.  Climate change has very real implications for the human 
dimensions of development.  Although livelihoods have constantly adapted to 
change, the impacts of climate change may push people beyond their capacity to cope 
and adapt, because of an increasing magnitude, frequency or rate, particularly of 
weather-related disasters such as drought, storms and floods
4.  Climate-induced 
changes to resource flows will affect the viability of some livelihoods unless effective 
measures are taken to protect and diversify them through adaptation.  Adaptation 
must be seen as a process that is itself adaptive and flexible, in order to address 
locally specific and changing circumstances. 
 
Many of the factors that make climate change unique also make it complex.  It is a 
multi-scalar environmental and social problem, which affects different sectors
5.  
Adaptation concerns tend to be discussed largely at a global level through 
international policy and scenarios of change but the impacts of climate change are 
experienced at the local level.  It is therefore critical to ensure effective participation, 
capacity and empowerment of poor communities.  Climate change is likely to 
exacerbate social inequalities due to the uneven distribution of the costs of damage, 
necessary adaptation and mitigation efforts
6.  These inequalities require issues of 
equity and justice in climate change impacts and remedial measures to be addressed
7.  
Effective responses require a diversity of actors and organisations across the state-
                                                 
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001 Third Assessment Report. Cambridge University 
Press. 
2 Desanker P, Magadza C et al. 2001 ‘Africa’ Chapter in IPCC (ed) Climate change. Impacts, 
adaptations and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press pp. 489-531  
3 See Denton F, Sokona Y and Thomas JP 2000 Climate change and sustainable development strategies 
in the making: what should West African countries expect? OECD Report, ENDA-TM Dakar, Senegal, 
27p; and also Ashley C and Maxwell S 2002. Rethinking rural development, Development Policy 
Review, 19(4): 395-425. 
4 Sokona Y and Denton F. 2001 Climate Change Impacts: can Africa cope with the challenges? 
Climate Policy 1: 117– 123. 
5 Lemos MC and Agrawal A 2006 "Environmental Governance". Annu. Rev. Environ. Resources 30 
(in press). 
6 Paavola J and Adger WB 2002 Justice and adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Working Paper 23, 
UEA UK 
7 Thomas DSG and Twyman C 2005 Equity and justice in climate change adaptation amongst natural-
resource-dependant societies. Global Environmental Change A, 15(2): 115-124. 
  3society divide.  However, the high level of uncertainty around definitions of the 
magnitude and character of climate change impacts in different human and natural 
systems, and the fact that they might not be felt immediately, makes it difficult to 
mobilise political and financial will.  Institutional capacity must be strengthened in 
order to lesson the gaps between local and national processes, and between formal 
and informal patterns of adaptation, as well as identify priorities.  Indeed the need for 
‘climate proofing’ applies to small (such as microcredit schemes) and large (such as 
infrastructure construction) development projects.  Adaptation clearly needs to be 
considered within wider-development processes, including non-structural policy and 
institutional frameworks, rather than separated in isolated measures, which are funded 
and executed discretely.  Identifying a more holistic approach to building resilience 
and adaptive capacity is central to sustainable development pathways under climate 
change conditions. 
 
There is an increasing trend in the literature and by agencies in the donor community 
toward understanding how best to improve adaptation and resilience to climate 
change vulnerability across multiple scales.  However, the institutional support and 
the mechanisms to support local level adaptation still needs attention.  The 
perpetration of conflicting agendas in development practice is a major constraint to 
creating sustainable adaptation to climate change risk and appropriate development 
architecture. For example, understandings of adaptation are viewed differently by 
approaches that focus on disaster risk management, poverty reduction and economic 
development, and the climate change adaptation community.  Each brings useful 
frameworks and lessons of where integration in governance and adaptation 
mechanisms work and where they do not, across different scales and timeframes.  
These lessons have implications for the human dimensions of development and 
practice in a warming world.  This paper focuses only on adaptation in developing 
countries by exploring specific examples from recent research and assessing their 
impact on the effectiveness of development projects.  In particular, it seeks to identify 
characteristics of adaptation interventions in the context of longer-term disaster risk 
reduction and development, and draw on the examples to explore how to improve and 
fund adaptive capacity and resilience at local, national and sectoral scales.  
 
The paper considers these interrelated questions in two sections.  Part I briefly 
introduces the key concepts and how they are used in the paper, before exploring, 
using illustrative examples, the resilience of adaptation strategies undertaken by the 
poor.  Lessons from local adaptation practice are important in understanding complex 
vulnerability-livelihood interactions, but also for identifying the limits to local coping 
strategies.  In considering the sustainability of strategies and limits to the ability of 
the poor to respond autonomously to climate change, the paper highlights the role of 
institutional support, national adaptation strategies and resilience at different scales. 
Characteristics that enhance positive development are outlined and specific elements 
of adaptation practice and intervention that might be important in enhancing longer-
term resilience to climate change in developing countries (and under what policy 
options) are discussed.  
 
In part II, climate change adaptation is contextualised within wider human 
development debates. Governance approaches to mainstreaming climate change 
concerns into poverty reduction and development agendas are considered.  How can 
governments succeed in pro-poor adaptation measures when many already 
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welfare or planning?  If climate change is likely to increase existing pressures, 
making the poor in many developing regions more vulnerable, national adaptation 
governance and its linkages with disaster reduction management and poverty 
reduction practice, must be critically assessed.  Institutional mechanisms and scope 
for integration are discussed in terms of potential entry points for integrated action 
and financing.  For example, the links between adaptation actions and broader 
development policy (such as insurance, drought and flood resistance, or social 
welfare programmes) that governments and other stakeholders should be taking 
regardless of climate change.  
 
  52. Building livelihood adaptation for the poor  
 
 
2.1 Adaptation and resilience processes in development 
 
The term ‘adaptation’ has become synonymous with the climate change community, 
with actions taken before or after climate change to enable people to best cope with 
the impacts.  Adaptation is often promoted through governance reforms that focus on 
building adaptive capacity.  Generally, it refers to improving the capacity (resilience), 
and thereby reducing the vulnerability of individuals or states, to respond to climate 
change impacts.  Adaptive capacity is the potential capability or ability of a system to 
adapt to climate change stimuli or their impacts. There has been research interest on 
developing indicators of adaptive capacity measures.  Adaptation is the ability of 
social and environmental systems to adjust to change in order to cope with the 
consequences of change
8.  It is seen as the heterogeneity of a system or the diversity 
amongst institutions and assets available in social systems
9.  Adaptation is not a 
solution for development problems, however it does offer an opportunity to rethink 
our approach to longer-term risk and engage different discourses. 
 
Climate change is often considered within an ‘environmental space’, sometimes only 
superficially considered as a development issue.  Adaptation is a necessity because 
climate change will influence current development mechanisms and the sustainability 
of development pathways. These pathways should enhance the capacity of 
communities and countries to adapt to livelihood risk and disturbance.  The 
independent evolution of climate change and development discourses provides an 
explanation as to why the two areas have operated largely independently from one 
another
10.  Climate change has heavily relied on the natural sciences for direction, 
while development has used social and political sciences for policy.  By contrast, 
there is a wealth of development literature addressing climate variability, such as in 
disaster risk reduction research
11.  However, this does not always translate into 
climate change adaptation policy.  There have been recent donor-led initiatives to 
strengthen the links between the two communities and attempts to develop 
frameworks to mainstream climate change but, essentially, there remains an urgent 
need to continue to ‘recast’ adaptation as a consideration of climate change risks 
within development issues. 
 
Integration began with the publication of a report on Poverty and Climate Change by 
ten of the leading bilateral and multilateral development funding agencies
12.  This 
was followed by efforts in specific sectors, such as health, agriculture, water and 
                                                 
8 Burton I, Huq S, Lim B, Pilifosova O and Schipper EL 2002 From impacts assessment to adaptation 
policies: the shaping of adaptation policy, Climate Policy 2: 145-159. 
9 Perrings C 2006 Resilience and sustainable development, Environment and Development, 11: 417-
427. 
10 Ideas developed in Huq S, Reid H and Murray LA 2006 Climate change and development links, 
IIED Gatekeeper Series 123; also see Swart R, Robinson J and Cohen S 2003 Climate change and 
sustainable development, Climate Policy 3S1:S19-40. 
11 Yamin F and Huq S 2005 Vulnerability, adaptation and climate disasters. Institute of Development 
Studies IDS Bulletin 36(4). University of Sussex, Brighton 
12 Sperling F (ed) 2003 Poverty and climate change: reducing the vulnerability of the poor through 
adaptation. World Bank, Washington. 
  6disaster management, as well as non-government organisations.
13  While adaptation 
to climate change is reviewed in the context of adaptive capacity and vulnerability
14, 
it is already implicit in the political ecology field, which considers power, resource 
use, entitlements and food security. A key feature is its demonstration of how the 
adaptive capacity of individuals or households is shaped and constrained by social, 
political and economic processes.
15  
 
There is a specific scale problem to consider.  Temporally, the impacts of climate 
change are uncertain and likely to be long-term whereas development scenarios are 
shorter-term (e.g. Millennium Development Goals are set for 2015).  Spatially, 
science has struggled to provide information at the local or national level that will 
benefit development practitioners today.  A number of research organisations do now 
explicitly incorporate development issues with climate change, including the 
livelihoods approach, and created thematic links between poverty and vulnerability.
16  
One of the keys to catalyzing adaptation ideas will be to mainstream consideration of 
climate change risks into wider livelihood development policy and create incentives 
at the national level to do this.  At the local level, the critical factor for livelihood 
sustainability is resilience, or the capacity to cope and adapt, and the conservation of 
sources of innovation and renewal
17.  For example, social networks that transfer 
information and financial support and facilitate collective action.  Theoretically, 
resilience is a measure of the amount of change a system can undergo, while retaining 
the same controls on structure and function
18.   
 
Strengthening the capacity of societies to manage resilience is critical to effectively 
pursuing sustainable development under conditions of climate change.  Nonetheless, 
this confronts many unanswered questions, such as the issue of resilience of what, 
who manages and for what purpose?  What are the consequences of alternative 
courses of action for different stakeholder groups?  As competing stakeholders try to 
transform their livelihood strategies there will be winners and losers.  While regional 
systems invariably yield a complex set of knowledges, ‘optimal best practices’ and 
‘appropriate stakeholders’, it remains essential to draw on local evidence to assess 
how certain attributes of governance functions enhance the capacity to manage 
                                                 
13 Simms A, Magrath J and Reid H 2004 Up in Smoke: threats from, and responses to, the impact of 
global warming on human development. New Economics Foundation, London 
14 Smit B and Wandel J 2006 Adaptation, adaptive capacity and vulnerability, Global Environmental 
Change 16: 282-292 
15 O’Brien K and Leichenko R 2000 Double exposure: assessing the impacts of climate change within 
the context of globalisation. Global Environmental Change, 10: 221-232; Blaikie P and Brookfield H 
1987. Land Degradation and Society. Methuen, London; Sen A 1981 Poverty and Famine Oxford, 
Clarendon Press; Walker B. 2005. A resilience approach to integrated assessment. The Integrated 
Assessment Journal 5: 77-97; Adger W.N. 2000. Social and ecological resilience: are they related? 
Progress in Human Geography, 24 (3): 347-364; Batterbury SPJ and Fernando JL 2006 Rescaling 
governance and the impacts of political and environmental decentralisation, an introduction, World 
Development 34(11):1851-1863 
16 E.g. In the UK, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, International Institute for Environment 
and Development, Stockholm Environment Institute, the Climate Change Knowledge Network, 
Institute for Development Studies. 
17 Lebel L, Anderies JM, Campbell B, Folke C, Hatfield-Dodds S, Hughes T and Wilson J 2006 
Governance and the capacity to management resilience in regional socio-ecological systems. Ecology 
and Society 11(1):19. 
18 Holling CS 2001 Understanding the complexity of economic, ecological and social systems, 
Ecosystems, 4: 390-405. 
  7livelihood resilience, particularly to climate change.  Thus, it may be possible to 
identify gaps in the process, the role of autonomous versus planned adaptations, 
markers of success within complex adaptive systems and future development options.  
But how to define what is effective by whom and how?  Identifying effective 
adaptation and key elements of success from case studies are crucial, as are barriers 
and opportunities with scope for scaling up. 
 
 
2.2 Learning from local adaptation practice 
 
Individuals, communities, nations have to varying degrees had to cope and adapt for 
centuries
19.  People are already adapting to climate variability and change on a daily 
basis and there is evidence that people act positively to enhance their resilience to 
livelihood stresses
20.  However, livelihoods are dynamic, complex and variable.  We 
must continue to examine vulnerability-livelihood interactions, especially how the 
poor cope and adapt to on-going climate variability and adversity. This section 
reviews the multiple ways in which livelihoods deal with climatic adversity.  Local 
experiences offer important lessons for national government wishing to support 
adaptation strategies.
21   Is it possible to characterise successful adaptation actions 
that reduce livelihood and community vulnerability to climate-related disasters and 
climate change and variability? 
 
Short examples are used from the ADAPTIVE Project
22, which explored local level 
coping and livelihood adaptation to climate change in South Africa and Mozambique. 
The project set out to identify characteristics of successful adaptation at locations that 
had significantly different climate patterns.
23  These locations experienced dry regular 
drought (Lehurutshe District, NorthWest Province, South Africa); a drying trend and 
pervasive drought (Dzanani District, Limpopo Province, South Africa); increasing 
intensity and variability (uThukela District, KwaZulu Natal Province, South Africa) 
and extreme flood and drought events (Manjacaze District, Gaza Province, 
Mozambique).  Success should reduce risks, not reduce future options, and build 
livelihood resilience.  Successful adaptation is a normative value-laden concept and 
requires consideration of governance and legitimacy issues at different scales.  There 
will always be multiple pathways within the ‘response space’. Not all responses may 
have a positive impact on livelihood resilience, as there are spatial spillovers and 
negative externalities.  For example, a community as a whole may be resilient but 
there will still be winners and losers within the community at the household level 
because some individuals will be better able to capture the benefits of adaptation. 
Autonomous decisions can also be constrained by the wider economic and socio-
                                                 
19 Tyson PD, Lee-Thorp J, Holmgren K and Thackeray JF 2002 Changing gradients of climate change 
in southern Africa during the past millennium: implications for population movements, Climatic 
Change  52:129-135; Washington R et al, 2004 African Climate Report, DFID, Defra. 
20 Thomas DSG, Twyman C, Osbahr H and Hewitson B 2007 Adapting to climate change and 
variability in southern Africa: farmer responses to intra-seasonal precipitation trends Climatic Change 
in press; Osbahr H, Twyman C and Thomas DSG 2007 Effective livelihood adaptation to climate 
change disturbance: scale dimensions of practice in Mozambique, Geoforum in review 
21 Hellmuth ME, Moorhead A, Thomson MC and Williams J 2007 Climate risk management in Africa: 
learning from practice, International Research Institute for Climate and Society 
22 ADAPTIVE was a multi-partner project in Southern Africa funded by the Tyndall Centre for Climate 
Change Research 2002-2005. 
23 See note 20. 
  8political environment (e.g. poor access to markets, finance or information), locking 
individuals into particular pathways (i.e. there may be limits to the resilience of local 
practices to future risk).
24  Within a resilience framework, the ADAPTIVE project 
assessed household ability to absorb shocks and buffer disturbance, self-organise, and 
innovate and learn. Which processes, institutions and types of agents characterise 
engagements that facilitate livelihood adaptation? The next two sections illustrate 
these issues. 
 
Coping with livelihood disturbance from climate variability and shocks 
 
Coping was revealed as a reactive response over a short-time frame, with different 
types of coping performed simultaneously by different members of a household to 
interacting shocks.
25 The critical institutions that facilitate these processes are (1) 
informal networks of dependence developed to facilitate daily livelihood activities, 
including those associated with generating economic income and support (e.g. 
kinship relationships and close neighbours) and (2) informal networks outside the 
village that generate new networks and opportunities. These social structures bind 
individuals together and are especially important where there is a history of limited 
formal safety nets, as was the case in Mozambique (see Case A).  
 
Reciprocal exchange between friends and family to access services and goods are at 
the heart of this coping.  These are informal non-cash networks that must be regularly 
invested in to make them part of a risk-adverse livelihood strategy and are often 
exclusive, defined by kinship, neighbourhood or friendship with loose, spontaneous 
and changeable characteristics.  In response to short-term drought or floods in 
Mozambique for example, households will sell livestock or practice labour exchange 
to manage reduced family labour supply should members have been forced to 
temporarily seek paid work elsewhere.  The ability to participate in exchange is 
differentiated by household demography, with larger householders, especially those 
with more young men, best placed to use the system and secure livelihood stability 
(see Case A for the gender inequalities to coping).  The proportion of the types of 
these informal networks reflected the level of community stability, with for example a 
high dependence on external networks indicating that local networks are a particular 
problem.
26  Maintaining external relationships bring flexibility during times of 
difficultly.  However, certain aspects of institutional control may be highly resistant 
to change, especially those that perpetrate social exclusion and structure within a 
society.  These patterns tend to be a consequence of changing economic and social 
history. Coping responses are only a ‘snap-shot’ of resilience because communities 
will experience a constantly changing pattern of reciprocity and informal networks.  
In terms of the concept of ‘success’ as stability, this can only exist when inclusive 
                                                 
24 This approach has similarities with frameworks of entitlements (Leach M, Mearns R And Scoones I, 
1999 Environmental Entitlements: Dynamics and Institutions in Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management, World Development, 27 (2): 225-247), Livelihoods (Chambers R, Pacey A and Thrupp 
LA 1989 Farmer First: Farmer Innovation and Agricultural Research, Intermediate Technology 
Publications), Access theory (Ribot J and Peluso NL 2003 A Theory of access, Rural sociology 68(2): 
153-181) and the Pressure-Release Model (Blaikie P, Cannon T, Davis I and Wisner B 1994 At risk: 
natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters London, Routledge). 
25 Although investing in building social capital requires long-term investment, the act of coping with 
shocks, which draws on these social mechanisms, tends to be short term response.  
26 This was the case in villages in KwaZulu Natal Province in South Africa where exclusive political 
networks which provided temporary jobs or remittances alienated the youth and the poor.  
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experienced in the Mozambique example in Case A).   
 
Case A. Livelihood coping in Gaza Province, Mozambique 
 
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world with more than 50% of its 
19.7 million people living in extreme poverty.  Development has been compromised 
in recent years by civil war and conflict, as well as spiralling rates of HIV/AIDS.  The 
government has only recently addressed political decentralisation and local rights. 
Economic restructuring has facilitated a rapid growth rate in urban areas, but done 
little to support economic livelihood renewal in the rural areas.  Over 80% of the 
population works in agriculture and fisheries but these mainly subsistence farmers 
are vulnerable to the impacts of climate variability and extreme weather events.  
Since 1980, there have been seven major droughts and seven major floods, with an 
average of 3-4 cyclones sweeping in from the coast each year.  The country is also 
situated downstream of nine major drainage systems for southeastern Africa, 
resulting in an estimated 50% of water coming from outside the country (making the 
region vulnerable to flooding during intense rains). With rainfall expected decline by 
10-15% and temperatures to increase by 2025, the risk of slow-onset drought is 
likely to increase. 
 
The ADAPTIVE Project worked with the National Institute for Disaster Management 
(INGC), Department of Agriculture, University Eduardo Mondlane and Save the 
Children US in southern Mozambique to assess the characteristics of local 
responses used to cope with livelihood disturbance, particularly to climate variability 
and extremes in Nwadjahane village.  The research identified a distinct set of generic 
responses that include trade-offs between reduction/depleting actions and traditional 
exchange (the cornerstone of resilient risk-averse livelihoods).  Reciprocity is used to 
access labour, food, cash, information, childcare, crafts, poultry, and smallstock 
(resources that that are limited by formal services). 
 
During 2003-4, ability to reciprocate through informal institutions was practiced 
regularly by 86% of households in the village as a form of livelihood insurance.  A 
number of traditional practices were identified which have proved effective in helping 
the community maintain livelihood stability during drought and flooding.  These 
included ‘Kurhimela’ (labour exchange by women), ‘Kuthekela’ (caring for livestock in 
return for the first-born), ‘Matsoni’ (labour exchange), ‘tsima’ (provision of food or 
alcohol by a family in return for group farm work), and ‘ganho-ganho’ (food for work 
provided by the State and NGOs).  Effectiveness of these practices has also to be 
placed in context of the loss of cattle during the1980s drought, a turn-down in 
regional economy in the 1990s that reduced employment options and the floods in 
the 2000, which further increased vulnerability.  The impacts even hit wealthy 
farmers who had chosen to specialise by focusing on one type of asset (i.e. 
rebuilding their cattle herds).  There has been increased popularity in certain types of 
exchange, with more households practising informal labour exchange for example, 
because of limited access to technology and capital.  Effectiveness should also be 
contextualised within ideas of differentiated dependence (coping reflects increasing 
dependence).  For example, within the ‘moral economy’ households must practice 
active give and receive exchanges to maintain their safety net, but what if you are 
unable to participate?  Women and small households found this particularly difficult 
and while traditional informal networks continue to protect social norms and provide 
effective coping at community level, they can be exploited and this helps to explain 
entrenched inequalities in vulnerable communities.  
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Characteristics of adaptive strategies across the ADAPTIVE study areas 
 
The research assessed individual and collective actions to understand how particular 
institutions mediate the process of adaptation.
27 Farm activities were often reliant on 
individual actions but for all other adaptations collective action facilitated changes, 
including commercialisation and building social capital. For example, Case B 
illustrates the use of collective agricultural projects in Limpopo Province, South 
Africa, to access markets, microcredit and crop information. Longer-term adaptations 
could be categorised into three responses (1) changes in the farming practice in the 
short-term (e.g. changing crop type or variety) (2) exploiting the spatial and temporal 
diversity of the landscape (e.g. using irrigated, lowland or highland areas) and (3) 
commercialising livelihoods through individual and collective action (e.g. 
specialising in a particular marketable crop or livestock product) (see Case B). We 
used coding that allowed climate dimensions to be identified (it was not necessary to 
ignore other disturbances) and climate was recognised as a significant factor.
28  
Livelihood adaptation is not solely being driven by climate factors; adaptations are 
being made with a clear knowledge of climate factors.  Case B below provides 
insights into adaptation strategies within context of these other livelihood pressures in 
South Africa.   
 
Case B. Livelihood adaptations in northern Limpopo Province, South Africa 
 
Northern Limpopo Province has a mean annual rainfall of 400-500mm. Climate data 
show evidence of a growing length to the dry season, resulting in a later start to the 
wet season, in late October – early November.  In addition, within the wet season 
there has been a trend towards fewer rain days in November and December and an 
increase in the overall occurrence of dry spells, in effect representing potentially 
damaging rainless spells within the growing season.  Serious droughts have been 
frequent in the last two decades (e.g. 1982-3, 1987, 1990, 1994 and 2004). These 
climate characteristics were recognised by people living in Khomele village, where 
they were dependent on farming and remittances for their livelihoods. 
 
Households make temporary changes to farming practice to cope with these 
conditions such as reducing the area of dryland cropping or changing varieties. As 
the practices were repeated they were adapted to manage the change seasonal 
variability.
29 These include grinding maize stalks as feed, cutting fodder and wild 
plants, selling livestock and breeding more resilient indigenous species, planting 
winter crops and late-maturing fruit trees, using more irrigated land and adopting 
resilient maize varieties. In the longer term, people have gained access to land 
beyond their village in an attempt to further exploiting the local spatial variability of 
rainfall and gain access to alternative water resources. Access has been possible by 
investing in existing friendship networks to form small project groups, and by drawing 
on extended family in nearby areas to gain access to new land. The ability to access 
                                                 
27 Osbahr H, Twyman C, Adger N and Thomas DSG 2007 Successful adaptation: social networks, 
resilience and climate change, in review Ecology and Society 
28 Thomas DSG, Twyman C, Osbahr H and Hewitson B 2007 Adapting to climate change and 
variability in southern Africa: farmer responses to intra-seasonal precipitation trends Climatic Change 
in press 
29 Households use multidimensional coping practices rather than sequencing as generally outlined in 
the food security literature (i.e. reducing, depleting, temporary moving, regenerative adaptive strategies 
are used by different household members). 
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apartheid government.  For example, five young farmers from Khomele were 
successful in getting 10ha plots in the Nwanedi farm area. This has given them 
regular access to river water that is used to irrigate large commercial fields, a 
resource not readily available in Khomele.  
 
Collective action as emerged as a key way to set up new opportunities to reduce the 
vulnerability to the risks associated with climate uncertainty.  Khomele has a strong 
profile of community cohesion and consensus around livelihood issues, which helped 
produced to endure.  Agricultural projects that utilised local knowledge and had a 
market base were the most successful.  Small-scale horticultural projects have 
emerged to supplement the stable crops of sorghum and maize.  Species of 
tomatoes were chosen deliberately for their drought resistant proprieties and short-
growing times, even through overall yields were lower than other varieties in good 
years.  The community has managed trade-offs between productivity and longer 
term resilience.  Other projects focused on pig and cattle production to improve food 
security and income.  Many of the projects built on existing groups of people who 
had built up trust over time so that experimentation and innovation were shared and 
viewed as risk-adverse rather than risk-prone strategies.  Their endurance was 
dependent on positive reinforcement of traditional networks. 
 
 
Facilitating sustainable adaptations at the local level 
 
The ability to perform autonomous actions and learn using new knowledge is critical 
to the process of innovation and livelihood resilience.  This is best achieved firstly 
when there is multi-level institutional involvement in new initiatives. For example, 
the commercial horticulture project in Case B was carried out by local communities 
with support from local extension services, commercial associations, local factories, 
the District Agriculture Department and as part of the Provincial strategy to improve 
food security and reduce poverty. Second, formal communication pathways were 
essential to achieving equitable development opportunities. Structured learning 
forums, training and skills exchange visits helped to transfer innovative new practice 
and knowledge. For example, the community in Case B was trained with extension 
officers on crop experimentation and taken to commercially successful projects in the 
region. Third, heterogeneity in stakeholders was important to the endurance of a 
project. In particular, individuals within each community with external networks, 
education or history of migrant work primarily undertook successful individual 
actions. These individuals were characterised by their entrepreneurial and risk-taking 
attitudes and were responsible for inspiring success in the village in Case B. 
‘Capturing’ entrepreneurs reinforces young people’s belief that self-development will 
bring opportunities (e.g. maize cooperatives in KwaZulu Natal Province in South 
Africa has allowed farmers to spread their risk but the initiative was set up by 
knowledgeable commercial farm labourers returning their community).  These key 
individuals contribute to collective stability because they possess latent capacity to 
initiate new projects.  
 
The development of formal structures and associations, specifically those that can 
support responses to seasonal variability, helped provide continuity in poverty 
reduction strategies and food security. The most successful had links with formal 
institutions at different scales. For example, the coping responses in Mozambique 
(Case A) have been supported by government and NGO development of formal 
  12agricultural associations, labour exchange and information transfer (Case C). It is 
particularly important to understand these polycentric, multi-layered arrangements as 
they offer opportunities to enhance local adaptive capacity. For example, by 
promoting networks of engagement (outside the community) this can develop 
opportunities for microfinance and improved technical or business skills.  Where 
positive reinforcement of local social structures occurs, it is easier for a community to 
further self-organise and make priorities (as well as opportunities to establish local 
ownership).  In Case B, the collective irrigation scheme in Limpopo, South Africa, 
facilitated by cooperation between local politicians, traditional leaders and civic 
representatives, used structured forums to give legitimacy to flexible decision-making 
structures that promoted inclusive learning, experimentation and innovation.   
Although differentiated by success across location, farmer-to-farmer learning and 
training enables individuals to realise their own capacity to make decisions as they 
move from semi-subsistence livelihoods to those incorporating commercial 
agricultural opportunities.  These characteristics of institutional support are illustrated 
in more detail in Cases C-E.   
 
The concept of multiple linkages in adaptation projects are more realistic than 
simplistic representations of coping and adaptation, especially as actions are much 
less definitive in practice.  Local development models need to take a holistic and 
multi-scalar perspective to livelihood adaptation.  This approach will help to explain 
why adaptations at the village-scale can sometimes impede adaptation at the 
household-scale; adaptation is a competitive process, subtly differentiated by context, 
adaptive capacity and perception of risk.  Trade offs between productivity and 
resilience mean that the most resilient systems in the long-term may not be the most 
productive in the short term.  This trade off exists at every spatial scale.  Thus, there 
are limits to adaptive projects and their inherent capacity to support responses to 
climate change for all. There are also concerns about major threshold changes in 
socio-environmental systems, which could fundamentally limit adaptation itself (e.g. 
2% temperature rises could significantly reduce coffee exports from Uganda, the 
sustainability of pastoralism in Kenya or lead to the loss of many small island states). 
For example, research on water supply to the poor in Mexico City identifies the 
importance of intervention, regulation and government policy in an area that will 
experience serious water shortages resulting from interacting feedbacks between 
climate change, increasing water demand and over-extraction of limited resources.
30   
 
Despite the value of local coping knowledge, we need to accept that there are limits to 
autonomous adaptation because of numerous constraints (e.g. poverty, poor 
infrastructure and market opportunities), empirical evidence that suggests the most 
effective adaptations are multi-scalar, and that the scale of climate change may be 
such that new thresholds may be reached. Unequal coping processes are exacerbated 
where formal institutions are weak at the village level.  Case A illustrated how local 
reciprocity remains difficult for the most vulnerable, and these problems are 
compounded by exclusive informal institutions. Individuals who were able to capture 
the adaptation process, were able to varying degrees reinforce pre-existing social 
hierarchies, power and entitlement inequalities.  While small households practiced 
risk-adverse strategies, larger cash-rich households were able to invest in both 
                                                 
30 Arredondo JC 2007 Adapting to impacts of climate change on water supply in Mexico City, 
Background paper prepared for UNDP 
  13networks of reciprocity and more specialized livelihood strategies including 
commercial options. This made them better able to develop networks of engagement 
across different scales and gain access to a diversity of future options. 
 
However, without formal structures this strategy also has limits. Although 
vulnerability to the impacts of climate change may be buffered by building a wide 
network of ties in the geographic sense, Case A illustrated how households that only 
invested in external ties or a specialized dependent livelihood strategy still risked 
future vulnerability, should they become unable to maintain the networks.   
Furthermore, that risk was not exclusive to the poor.  
 
While there is no doubt that cooperative social networking spawns new possibilities 
for access to environmental resources (Case B), successful adaptation is a learned 
process and most easily facilitated where there are formal communication channels 
and responsibilities.
31  Only when individual success was captured by collective 
actions did individuals not impede the success of village-level adaptation or increase 
differentiation in capacity to adapt.  For example, the limitations to coping for the 
most vulnerable in Mozambique (Case A) were overcome by agricultural projects that 
formalized information and skill transfer and gave women in particular new 
confidence to establish their own collective farming projects that reduced their 
household vulnerability to drought (see Case C).  
 
 
2.3 What role for institutional support? 
 
The question is how these adaptive livelihood strategies be strengthened (or 
undermined) by government action, and how lessons can be scaled up and 
transferred?  Because the problem of climate change is relatively new, there is a 
danger that the ‘adaptation’ community could be perceived as reinventing 
‘development’ by recommending the need for action on adaptive capacity. Although 
institutions of the state and civil society both constrain and facilitate adaptation, top-
down solutions have rarely enhanced legitimacy and built on local lessons.
32  It is 
critical therefore to identify characteristics of appropriate legal, policy and 
institutional frameworks through which adaptation measures can be implemented.   
Especially those that permit evolutionary change and learning to be incorporated, and 
the role of structural and non-structural characteristics. 
 
To identify appropriate characteristics, we can consider the underpinning of 
institutional theory.  Governance, the structures and processes by which societies 
share power, shapes individual and collective actions and can be formally 
institutionalised or expressed through subtle norms of interaction.
 33  Both influence 
the agendas that are set to support adaptation actions.  For example, the Resilience 
Alliance
34have explored characteristics that include: participation to build trust; 
                                                 
31 Osbahr H at al 2007 Effective livelihood adaptation to climate change disturbance: scale dimensions 
of practice in Mozambique. Geoforum in review 
32 Nguyen Huu Ninh, Vu Kien Trung and Nguyen Xuan Niem 2007 Coastal flooding in the Mekong 
Delta, Background paper prepared for UNDP 
33 Young, OR 2002 The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale. 
MIT Press, 2002 
34 Website for Resilience Alliance www.resalliance.org/
  14deliberation to share understanding of the need to mobilise and self-organise; 
polycentric and multi-layered institutions to improve the fit between knowledge, 
action and the context in which societies can respond more adaptively at appropriate 
scales; and accountable authorities to pursue just distributions of benefits and 
involuntary risks enhance the adaptive capacity of vulnerable groups.  This has 
similarities to approaches that seek to offer organising frameworks for environmental 
change and social behaviour.
35  
 
The three Cases (C-E) in this section illustrate the role of national adaptation policy 
and their multi-scale influence on local adaptation strategies. It is critical to identify 
the scalar dimensions of practice, or the processes of engagement between different 
institutions, policy, social networks and agents.  Each Case highlights different 
characteristics. Case C outlines how coordinated national food security, agriculture, 
poverty reduction and disaster planning policy in Mozambique have helped to support 
emergent conditions for local adaptation strategies in rural areas.  Case D explores the 
potential role of national adaptation planning in the water section in Malawi and the 
role of the NAPAs in re-conceptualising linkages between the local and national. 
Unlike the Mozambique example, there has been an explicit focus on investment in 
infrastructure as well as human capacity. Case E illustrates the success of a national 
policy in Mali to provide access to good climate information to farmers in order to 
support more effective local decision-making. 
 
Case C. Environmental governance and national initiatives to support 
emergent conditions for adaptation in rural Mozambique  
 
The Mozambique government worked hard with international donors to rebuild the 
county after the end of the civil war in 1992 and economic growth rates have 
averaged around 8%. However, the development process has been uneven with 
rural areas lagging behind the urban centres and livelihoods have suffered shocks 
from rapid economic liberalisation (especially the collapse of cashew market). The 
legacy of collectives and forced labour are still evident in social behaviour in rural 
areas. Accessing productive lowland areas can also be difficult for rural returnees 
and the ADAPTIVE project found the youth in rural areas frustrated by their 
subsistence lifestyle.   
 
The government has recognised that disaster risk management is an important entry 
point for stimulating livelihood adaptation.  First, a well-developed national disaster 
preparedness model, which incorporates actions at District levels has been 
implemented. Second, ‘development ideologies’ continue to define the Frelimo 
government, which has held power since independence and offered a role for 
coordinated oversight in livelihood renewal. Not all aspects have been positive, for 
example the process of decentralisation has retained a political and elitist approach 
and while there has been recognition of the trans-local intersections in society, the 
role of the traditional-local has politically ‘reinvented’ to support development 
ideologies.  
 
It was not until 1999 that a dedicated National Disaster Management Institute (INGC) 
was mandated to develop disaster plans and link these actions explicitly to poverty 
reduction considerations. In 2006, a Strategic National Disaster Management Plan 
was produced, which considers specific measures to prevent and mitigate disasters 
                                                 
35 E.g. Kite Framework for multiscalar practice - Campbell DJ and Olson JM 1991. "Framework for 
environment and development: the Kite." CASID Occasional Paper, 10. CASID, MSU.  
  15in the future, including education and vulnerability reduction. At a national level there 
are institutions to link decision makers to scientists and communicate advice from 
early warning systems. A cross-sectoral Vulnerability Assessment Committee 
integrates socio-environmental information as the basis for contingency planning, 
especially on drought. FEWSNET and the Southern African regional Climate Outlook 
Forum SAFCOF (part of SADC) supports national forecasting. The National 
Directorate of Water, the National Institute of Meteorology and the INGC coordinate 
water and climate information to forecast flooding risk. The government is 
increasingly using the media to communicate credible information to local 
communities.  
 
Within the Department of Agriculture, the PROAGRI Programme sought to engage 
stakeholders with the process of building resilience, especially in small-scale farming 
responses to slow onset threats such as drought. The programme considered 
interacting scales and broader development benefits such as food security and 
poverty-reduction. Agricultural Extension Workers and NGOs provided Service 
delivery. The programme helped to create choice, security and flexibility at the local 
level by supporting (1) forms of livelihood diversification
36 (2) collective dual land-use 
system to access natural diversity and (3) strategic reorganisation during the last five 
years of local social institutions that formalise reciprocity and facilitate innovation. 
 
These new formal institutions in the ADAPTIVE study village (Nwadjahane) were a 
catalyst for local innovation (increasing activity by 50%, with 45% using new 
technologies). The Extension Services sought to revive local agroforestry options, 
and support market development, which helped empower youth groups and improve 
land rights. The approaches combine traditional knowledge with scientific information 
and ensured diffusion of ideas through ‘para-extensionists’ (trained groups within the 
community). Over two thirds of the community now access ‘insurance plots’ (using 
different parts of the landscape to spread risk) through these formal farming 
associations. Support from donor organisations and local NGOs facilitated credit 
options to these farming groups increasing willingness to take risks and innovate.  
 
The ADAPTIVE case example highlights how adaptive responses operate at 
different scales through the form and timing of response and that scalar practice has 
helped to create emergent conditions in which people can establish their own 
objectives and influence. Although farming associations have increased community 
resilience, their ability to cope with future shocks remains uncertain. Furthermore, 
household level inequalities are not overcome by these policies, as there is still elite 
capture. It is important that the government recognise that there is more to facilitating 
enduring adaptations than building human capacity, problem solving and access to 
technology. Major infrastructural constraints and poverty continue to constrain 
opportunities to increase adaptive capacity. State policy in Mozambique needs to 
ensure that it reflects the complex scalar nature of rural livelihoods and does not 
reinforce entrenched inequalities. To achieve this, successful programmes such 
PROAGRI need to be established that consider supporting multiple livelihood 






                                                 
36 Although benefits are inequitably distributed due to household demography as explained in the 
previous section 
  16Case D. National adaptation planning and implementation for water resources 
in Malawi 
 
Malawi is a severely poor country in southern Africa facing an AIDS pandemic, 
chronic malnutrition, declining soil fertility, shortages of land and inadequate 
agricultural policies.  About 65% of its 12 million population live below the poverty 
line, the majority in rural areas (90% rely on rain-fed subsistence farming to 
survive).
37  Exogenous economic shocks and geopolitical events in the region have 
contributed to Malawi’s development performance
38 (e.g. the oil shock, the war in 
Mozambique and the decline in jobs in South Africa) but current vulnerability is also 
closely tied to local climate.  Between 1970 and 2006, Malawi experienced 40 
weather-related disasters, and 16 of these occurred after 1990.
39  In particular, the 
1991-2 drought in southern Africa caused suffering to 6.1 million people and a 
drought and flood in 2002 caused a major food crisis.  Increasing numbers of people 
are affected and there is a fear that food insecurity may become more widespread if 
drought becomes a semi-permanent phenomenon, because of future global climate 
change.
40  Evidence suggests that increased droughts and floods are already 




Reliable water resources will be a particular problem for sustainable adaptation. The 
government has sought to institutionalise responses that will benefit local 
communities.  However, water is only available from major rivers during June to 
December and the volume of water (in cubic metres per person per year) is well 
below the ideal for sustainable human development.  Flooding and drought is 
especially problematic in the Shire Valley in southern Malawi, reducing opportunities 
for irrigation and sustainable agriculture or fisheries.  The worst flooding events were 
in 1989 and 1991 but drought has become more frequent, with a recent crisis in 
2002.  With support from international donors, the government has generated policy 
to build small-scale irrigation dams across some of the major rivers and provide 
water to rice schemes in the lower Shire Valley and Karonga lakeshore area.  
Infrastructure investments include mini hydro power plants such as the Wovwe 
scheme, new boreholes and gravity-fed water supply schemes such as the Mpira-
Balaka dam, provision of dykes and levees to prevent floods from destroying crops 
and irrigation systems, dimba irrigation from streams and rainwater harvesting 
technologies.  One of the main constraints now is access to reliable climate 
information.   
 
New financial initiatives have also supported farmers’ adaptation decisions and 
addressed their limited investment capacity.  Malawi has been the pilot country for 
index-based weather insurance provided directly to smallholders as a way of dealing 
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  17with increasing drought risk.
42  Driven by the private sector this goes to the heart of 
unreliable water resources, crop failure and food insecurity in Malawi.  The scheme 
has been established using cross-sectoral support, and especially building on the 
existing role of agricultural extension services (e.g. for crop type and conditions). 
Unlike traditional insurance, it does not lead to perverse incentives for allowing crops 
to fail.  Only when rainfall falls below certain threshold will quick payouts to farmers 
be made, thus stopping the selling of valuable assets, which undermines long-term 
resilience.  The scheme has brought together a collation of stakeholder groups at 
different scales and in the future may help to limit large emergency payouts and 
systematic failure of traditional micro-credit systems after disasters.  However, it 
does not negate the importance of ‘safety nets’, especially for the most vulnerable 
and those without access to land, nor does it reduce the importance of establishing 
credit systems for farmers clubs and facilitating access to production loans.  
 
Malawi’s National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) was developed by the 
Ministry of Mines, Natural Resources and Environment (Environmental Affairs) and 
completed in 2006. Total costs to implement will likely top US$22.43 million. The 
NAPA priority project profile is to build on existing structures and initiatives to 
improve community resilience to climate change through the development of 
sustainable rural livelihoods.
43  In particular, the government is focusing on 
enhancing people’s capacity to cope with and adapt to drought and flood events in 
vulnerable areas such as the Shire Valley. Interventions focus on the non-structural 
elements of adaptation, including capacity building, skills transfer, the need for 
education, the dissemination of climate information and incorporation of traditional 
approaches to weather forecasting. International donors have invested in the Malawi 
Meteorological Department but it still needs to improve its weather forecasting 
techniques and ensure better information dissemination (which can be supported by 
regional initiatives and training).  
 
Skills will also be shared on water conservation techniques, such as use of new 
technologies for canal, spray and drip irrigation and the potential of recycling water 
(including inter-basin transfers with more storage facilities). The promotion of 
practices are similar to Mozambique with a focus on increasing the diversity of 
resilient crops, agroforestry, breeding of rabbits and  guinea fowls, and livestock 
production of animal breeds that are drought and disease tolerant. A revival of 
agroprocessing is aims to develop alternative livelihoods in addition to farming. 
However, the priorities are a reflection of the interests of the Department of 
Agriculture, and it is unclear how market access will be improved, the concerns of 
urban poor met, or if the Malawian government will create contingencies for climatic 
variability within the budget (as they have done with PRSPs). It is critical the national 
adaptation processes enlist support from NGOs and community based 
organisations, as there are many current barriers.  The political culture has both 
disempowered and corrupted the civil service, progressively undermining the 
capacity to generate coherent, technically-grounded policy approaches that can be 
realistically implemented in the long-term. Thus, limited delegation and reporting of 
the role of district level is evident. It is essential that there is improvement in 
developing local technical assistance to support these specific adaptation initiatives. 
 
 
                                                 
42 Hellmuth ME, Moorhead A, Thomson MC and Williams J (eds) 2007 Climate risk management in 
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  18Case E. Supporting climate information to cope and adapt in Mali 
 
In Mali, rainfed agriculture is the mainstay of most people’s livelihoods, but it is highly 
vulnerable to the frequent droughts in the region. Most of the country is arid/semi-
arid and less than 4% can be used to grow crops. Recognising that rural 
communities need help in managing rainfall risks, the National Meteorological 
Service launched a climate information project after the drought in the 1970s. Led by 
AGRHYMET, with technical support from international agencies, it was the first 
service in Africa to supply climate-related advice and recommendations directly to 
farmers, and to help them to measure climate variables themselves, so that they 
could incorporate climate information into their decision-making. A multi-disciplinary 
group includes members from the meteorological services, the Ministry of agriculture, 
agricultural research institutes, rural development agencies, farmers and the media. 
The group acts as a ‘boundary institution’, bridging the gap between the climate and 
agricultural communities by translating climate information into useful information 
and advice for farmers. 
 
The Malian government assumed full responsibility for the ‘agrometeorological 
project’ in 2005. Seasonal forecasts are produced by ACMAD using data from 
international sources for 10-day bulletins to the government for planning. Daily to 3-
day weather forecasts are prepared for target areas and broadcast to farmers by 
radio. The information is combined with advice from Agricultural Extensions workers 
on when to prepare the land, sow and apply fertilisers or pesticides. Today, farmers 
consistently report higher yields of maize, sorghum, pearl millet, groundnut and 
cotton from fields where information is used in decision making, with corresponding 
increases in farm income of up to 80%. The Organisation de la Haute Vallée du 
Niger has experienced the highest yields. Addressing soil fertility becomes more 
urgent where water availability is limited. More than 2000 farmers work directly with 
the project and many others access climate information through these representative 
farmers. They make better management decisions that lead to higher yield and 
incomes, take more risks, invest in new technologies; and actively seek information 
from other sources to improve future decision-making. 
 
The continuity of national policy has created significant benefits for farmers, reducing 
their exposure to risk. Success has been defined by political support from the 
government; long-term financial support from the principal donor, a farmer-centred 
approach, which has led to the development and delivery of climate products and 
services that meet user needs; and effective communication channels, especially 
between representative farmers and multi-disciplinary working groups. The project is 
continuously being scaled-up and evaluation workshops held every two years. The 
approach will need to be scaled-up to include more staple food crops to have a 
significant impact on food security and more importantly address the needs of 
livestock producers, a much more economically important group. As a project, its 
endurance will also be defined by access to markets and improved levels of 
education and training in marginal areas. 
 
 
The case examples illustrate different aspects of how national adaptation 
interventions can have positive influences on enhancing local adaptation actions.  The 
weighting given to structural and non-structural components of policy investment is 
dependent on country and sector.  However, in all cases, addressing the underlying 
causes of vulnerability in the context of sustainable livelihoods is the first step.  For 
these Cases to build longer-term sustainable adaptation, they must do more than 
support short-term coping capacity within a specific sector. Instead, they must 
  19address social transformation and address the foundations of inequality.  While 
diversity and heterogeneity at the local level is important, extremes of inequality 
increase vulnerability.  For example, traditional pastoral systems in eastern Kenya 
have sophisticated coping mechanisms but persistent inequality and poverty have 
translated into limits for adaptive strategies and conflict resolution.
44  The cases also 
illustrate that adaptive capacity does not need to be built through new ‘adaptation’ 
tools because local people and governments know how to do this.  The development 
community has been building resilience through empowerment, participation, 
accountability and democratisation, as well as coordination and financial 
transformation to support microcredit and new technologies.
45  Adaptation pathways 
are successful when part of longer-term activities, which build livelihood stability, 
self-organisation and innovation. 
 
Amongst the plethora of disturbances, climate does matter to livelihood decisions and 
the recognition of subtle climate-led changes in livelihoods and common forms of 
response at the local level indicate the importance of providing development options 
that consider the role of climate.  If targeting the poor, these should clearly be focused 
on agricultural and water sectors because of their dependency on natural resources 
(addressing different scales of adaptation would require other sectors to be targeted 
e.g. energy).  The examples highlight some useful policy options that would help to 
enhance successful adaptation: 
 
•  Climate tools: there is a need for improved tools for climate change data 
analysis to provide information that is credible. Reinforcing and sustaining 
climate observation networks is essential if the full potential of climate 
information is to be realised for individual sectors. However, outputs are most 
effective for livelihood decision-making when integrated into multi-
disciplinary frameworks. The example from Mali illustrates the success of 
good climate tools and information in improving adaptive strategies for rural 
farmers (Case E). 
 
•  Reinforce local support networks: informal institutions mediate livelihood 
stability and it is critical that new initiatives in any sector do not replace or 
challenge these systems. Although, it is possible to build adaptation options 
without high levels of community stability, these are unlikely to be resilient in 
the longer-term.  The Mozambique example (Cases A and C) illustrates the 
importance of recognising traditional social arrangements and coping. 
 
•  Ensure multi-level institutional involvement in adaptation initiatives: this 
requires investment in institutional capacity at all scales, but especially at the 
district-local level and participation by local communities. This helps to 
generate ‘networks of engagement’, which are critical to shaping human 
capacity, by incorporating local knowledge and empowering those most 
affected by the impacts of climate change. The establishment of new 
agricultural associations in South Africa and Mozambique illustrate how 
adaptation initiatives are, in a large part, due to multi-level institutional 
support (Cases C and D).  
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  20•  Build communication channels and forums: to support information/skills 
transfer and social learning. Improved communication offers opportunities for 
equitable pathways and decision making by poor people. Success depends on 
structured forums for sharing knowledge, technologies and skills, especially 
those that improve education and reinforce traditional networks. All case 
examples illustrate that this characteristic was best approached as a specific 
sector-based problem.  
 
•  Acknowledge the importance of heterogeneity of stakeholders: especially at 
local level where it is essential to capture ‘key brokers’ or entrepreneurs. This 
counters traditional aid approaches that target the most vulnerable. Equally, at 
the district and regional scale, it is important to create decision-making 
structures that bring together interdisciplinary stakeholders. Evidence suggests 
this helps to ensure reform is implemented in a particular sector.
46 
 
•  Develop innovative approaches to financing adaptation and building 
opportunities for resilient decision-making: For example, access to micro-
credit options that support local collective adaptation. The funding of relief 
efforts to support stability and coping are dealt with best through the reform of 
existing disaster relief funds. Instruments for the disbursement of adaptation 
funding need not deal solely with climate change aspects, indeed it would 
difficult to see how these would be defined as separate from development 
initiatives? However, the move to finance ‘specific’ adaptation projects in 
developing countries through the Adaptation Fund is an international priority. 
It is important to ensure that the private sector is not discouraged from 
investing in developing countries.
47  The Adaptation Fund will be replenished 
predominately through the private sector contributions generated in 
developing countries, and it is aimed at supporting developing countries. 
However, it is unlikely that the adaptation fund will provide for current 
demands. Capturing private sector funding may secure funding closer to the 
figure of US$41bn estimated by the World Bank for adaptation (which does 
not include retrofitting). Index-based weather insurance and better access to 
microcredit might help to stimulate local level innovation. Currently these 
mechanisms still exclude the most vulnerable groups (e.g. pastoralists). 
 
There are wider implications from these local lessons.  National and international 
responses need to deal with ‘the local’ in governance approaches (i.e. generate 
practices that do not lose sight of the diversity and subtle differences in place-based 
opportunities for success).  It is clear that the process of adaptation, even for 
successful pathways, will be competitive. Furthermore, not all development outcomes 
will be ‘win-win’ for development and climate change, despite sharing many of the 
same goals to reduce social and environmental vulnerability.  Where are conflicting 
interests, trade-offs will need to be addressed
48.  For example, development plans 
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  21may increase dependency on climate-sensitive resources, such as rain-fed agriculture, 
or reforming of water rights can sometimes increase the vulnerability for the poor. 
There is perhaps a danger of overemphasising local resilience as support for local 
adaptation is critical now.  The role for national bodies should be to support scaled 
planning frameworks that help to integrate risk management, development and 
adaptation concerns. The examples illustrate that socio-ecological resilience to 
climate change can be boosted in specific sectors. The wider governance 
opportunities for recasting adaptation within the development discourse are addressed 
in the next section. 
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  223. Governance for mainstreaming climate change concerns into 
poverty reduction and development agendas 
 
 
3.1 The need for an integrated policy approach 
 
Part 2 highlighted the importance of considering local livelihood adaptations to 
climate change within the context of broader development activities.  However, most 
governments and government agencies in developing countries, and the majority of 
local level development groups do not adequately address this integration.  This may 
seriously limit the long-term sustainability of current development pathways because 
future risks from climate change may negatively influence outcomes and create 
‘maladaptative’ societies, which is more vulnerability to climate futures. 
 
It is important that attention on the ‘adaptation deficit’ is the focus rather than 
attribution in pro-poor adaptation governance.  The challenge is to identify how best a 
government may develop the appropriate governance architecture, which supports 
flexibility and livelihood resilience and copes with climate variability and shocks. 
Mainstreaming adaptation within national development policy is especially important 
for marginal groups to be able to respond to changing climatic risk.  There is a cross-
scalar character to climate change (spatially, socio-politically and temporally) that 
adds significant complexity to governance solutions.  The development community 
has been considering for many years how to address poverty and enable the poor to 
cope with livelihood disturbance and different risks.  However, trends towards 
participatory development, investment in social networks, and provision of 
information and new institutions for resource management are a failure unless 
simultaneously investing in the causes of poverty.  Underlying causes of poverty will 
not facilitate adaptive capacity to be generated in the long-term. Therefore, 
investment in governance needs to go hand in hand with material development, 
structural economic reform and the politics of accountability.
49  
 
This section attempts to review what mainstreaming means in terms of operational, 
fiscal and integrated policy.  Examples illustrate how operational capacities for 
building adaptation and resilience have been integrated successfully into policy 
frameworks for poverty-alleviation and disaster reduction. There are overlapping 
objectives within the adaptation, development and disaster risk management 
communities for example, which provides an obvious entry point for analysis.   
Actions that build adaptive capacity across different scales (e.g. strengthening 
institutional networks or transfer of natural resource management information) are 
mainly the same as those needed for poverty reduction.  However, governments do 
not always build upon these synergies because responsibility for climate change 
policies tend to fall to environmental ministries while the importance of climate 
change as a force on the development agenda is not always well communicated to 
other departments. There are also a number of unanswered questions about the scale 
of response, the flexibility of a system to incorporate social learning and the 
institutional process of delivery itself, such as who defines effectiveness and what 
role local people play in decision-making? 
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  233.2 Adaptation governance into development practice: new synergies and 
conflicts 
 
This section critically reviews two examples of government policy that attempts to 
mainstream climate change concerns into the national development agenda and 
activities that aim to create linkages between policy and livelihoods of the poor. The 
first example comes from Kenya (Case F) and the second builds on the Malawi case 
(Cases D and G). The paper will then synthesise the barriers to mainstreaming 
responses to climate change within development planning, positive lessons, as well as 
explore opportunities for policy synergies at local and national levels, in terms of 
policy, operational and fiscal perspectives. 
 
Case F. Integrated responses to drought in Kenya 
 
Kenya is prone to flooding and particularly drought; two recent periods of intense 
drought have caused severe crop losses, famine and population displacement in the 
country since 2000.  With climate change, Kenya faces increased risks.  While global 
climate models suggest that the region from Lake Victoria to the central highlands 
east of the Rift Valley is likely to experience increases in annual rainfall, regions in 
the arid east and north of the country are likely to experience decreases.  Increased 
temperatures are likely to exacerbate the drought conditions already experienced 
and in the future may have a significant impact on water availability.  More 
unpredictability in seasonal rainfall will cause an increase in short heavy rainfall 
periods leading to flooding, landslides and water pollution.  These may be worse 
during El Niño years. 
 
Increased risk of drought and persistent vulnerability of the poor is likely to impact on 
poverty-reduction initiatives, national agricultural economy and food security, 
particularly in the arid and semi-arid regions.  The pastoral community may be worst 
affected.
50  Although mobility and migration are high, this can translate into pressure 
during drought on both the environment and services. Increased risk of drought will 
also negatively affect Kenya’s wildlife and hence the tourist industry, as well as 
reduce water supply and hydroelectric power generation. 
 
Nevertheless, Kenya may be well placed to adapt to these challenges.  There are 
strong existing institutional structures that support information transfer and inter-
agency planning. For example, the Kenyan Food Security Structure brings together 
government, scientists, NGOs and donors in managing drought response and 
planning.  A National Disaster Policy and the creation of an overarching national 
authority within government offers coordination and long-term oversight for 
mainstreaming future climate change risk, including funding incentives such as a 
Disasters Trust Fund.  The comprehensive network of research centres in Nairobi 
has led to proactive collaboration between some scientists and users of climate 
information, especially for training workshops and development of risk assessment 
tools via International Climate Prediction and Applications Centre.  Most significantly, 
there is a growing recognition that community-based participation and holistic 
approaches to disaster risk planning and capacity building are central to long-term 
solutions, with a process of decentralising the identification of cross-sectoral 
priorities and engaging communities. One specific example of coordinated planning 
at different administrative scales has been the government’s Arid Land Resources 
Management Project, which support rural livelihoods in the arid areas and is 
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  24supported by donor agencies and NGOs. The project is unique as a government 
Special Project because it places livelihoods, economic diversification and 
adaptation to all risks at the centre of its approach. The government has received 
further funding from the World Bank to expand its influence because of the project’s 
success. 
 
There are other mechanisms for mainstream climate change concerns at the 
national level. The government is establishing forums responsible for identifying 
priorities for integration and adaptation, supported by UN agencies. For example, the 
policy development of a National Platform (or coordinated meeting committee 
between government and international agencies) creates opportunities and 
incentives for national ownership and improved communication on responding to 
risks in Kenya. This is complementary to multilateral organisations’ international 
programmes on climate change adaptation and development. Another example is 
the creation of an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Climate Change by the Kenyan 
Environment Ministry. This committee provides a further mechanism for inter-
ministerial liaison. Furthermore, international climate change commitments create 
incentives for compliance in adaptation policy and mainstreaming by the government 
(for example Kenya is preparing their Second National Communication to the 
UNFCCC, which considers future climate change risks on development and cross-
sector solutions including education, energy and agriculture). Finally, Kenya has set 
poverty reduction targets, associated with the MDG and its national economic 
development strategy incentive, which have begun to create opportunities for private 
sector involvement. 
 
At the local level, numerous appropriate technology programmes support capacity 
building of rural livelihoods. The Kitui Sand Dams project is an specific example of 
an effective and manageable approach to storing and conserving water for use 
during the dry season.  Sand Dams are a small-scale community-led technology 
promoted by the SASOL Foundation.  The approach builds the adaptive capacity of 
people, which is seen as vital to improving current conditions and preventing further 
livelihood deterioration under future climate change.  The methodology encourages 




Case F highlights some specific approaches to mainstreaming by the Kenyan 
government that focus on coordination, placing livelihood of the poor at the centre of 
the approach and providing economic diversification and adaptation funds. However, 
the county faces a number of constraints that will continue to hinder the process. A 
research report made for the Vulnerability and Adaptation Resource Group, a 
partnership between major donors and NGOs, identified a number of specific issues.
51 
There is inadequate data provision for risk assessments over different timescales and a 
need to improve networks for information exchange and capacity building at the local 
level. Uncertainty in future impact and the lack of trust in science by users, both at 
community level and by policy makers, partly results from poor communication.   
Poverty, poor infrastructure and high vulnerability to disasters are fundamental 
constraints to the development process. As the case example illustrates, there have 
been some advances in institutional coordination. Economic planning will need to 
continue to consider the impact of climate change risk on all sectors and limited funds 
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  25for Special Projects will restrict their success. Piecemeal cooperation with donors and 
regional partners and agency-centred planning have not enhanced the ability of the 
government to coordinate its response and develop multi-layer of risk tools. Short-
term funding horizons, diverted resources to emergency relief and difficult political 
dynamics, including lack of leadership and formalisation of policy with proscribed 
windows are a common problem for many countries. A case review of Brazil outlines 
similar problems in Brazil for example.
52  
 
Five specific opportunities provide entry points and mechanisms for improved 
mainstreaming in Kenya. These are: (1) the application of advanced technology and 
identification and evaluation of risk; (2) forums for communication between 
scientists, decision makers, NGOs and communities; (3) the development of a 
coordinating framework to facilitate oversight and national ownership; (4) the 
development of structures that facilitate continuity of policy and promote flexibility 
of approach; and (5) funding priority, regional partnerships and coordinated financial 
tools. Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and adaptation brings multiple benefits 
and is politically attractive because it can help poverty reduction, reduce the high 
costs of disaster response and empower marginal communities.  The National 
Economic Recovery Strategy serves to tackle underlying vulnerability and poverty, 
which is especially important for slow-onset disasters like drought.  Budgetary 
allocations to ‘climate-proofing’ the development agenda will increase awareness of 
the importance of disaster risk reduction in adaptation projects. These five areas of 
opportunity in Kenya are discussed in more detail below. 
 
The focus on improving technology for the identification and evaluation of risk will 
require investment in user specific models and application products. National 
meteorological services can take a lead in developing these linkages. Existing 
networks and ground-truthing activities help to aggregate other types of data into 
integrated early warning systems. Improvements in downscaled climate models which 
provide better national information for decision making is currently being developed 
through regional collaboration for data integration and exchange. Improved 
collaboration and communication between different stakeholders can be developed 
through existing structures designed to raise awareness (e.g. within Ministry of 
Environment, climate change department and Inter-Ministerial Committee for 
Climate Change). These existing forums and centres bring together expertise (e.g. 
UN-ISDR hosted workshops, training forums, invest in ‘translators’, working 
manuals, media, technical committees) and support regional links. It remains essential 
to extend existing efforts to engage communities, through the extension services 
provided by the Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock and Water and NGO projects. 
Projects that protect livelihood assets and build local capacity (e.g. Special Projects in 
arid lands and water management) will enhance cross-sectoral and multi-scale 
coordination. 
 
There are a number of opportunities to establish coordinating frameworks at national 
scale, through the implementation of the recommendations in the National Disaster 
Policy, which would coordinate stakeholders and initiatives operating at different 
scales. Building on cross-sectoral liaison within existing disaster and hazard structures 
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  26and monitoring research and NGO outputs would encourage collaboration rather than 
duplication in activities. Institutional structures to implement these frameworks need 
to ensure continuity of policy. This requires clear responsibility, investment in 
extension services and partnerships with local communities. Flexibility in approach 
can be promoted through decentralised responsibilities and skills, and by allowing 
risk plans and monitoring to be updated regularly (for early warning systems, District 
level coordination through Steering Groups or Technical Committees within the 
Kenyan Food Security Structure for example). At the national level, development of 
the National Platform forum and National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) 
are tools to mainstream climate change adaptation policy, initiate systematic 
development programmes and enhance national partnership with UN agencies. The 
Inter-Ministerial Committee for Climate Change should be used to generate a culture of 
mainstreaming risk and adaptation by capacity building within government and 
establishing consistency in government contact. 
 
It is critical to identify mechanisms to increase funding priority, regional partnerships 
and coordinate financial tools for integration in Kenya. The National Disaster Policy 
aims to introduce a Disaster Trust Fund, explore risk transfer mechanisms (e.g. 
through insurance) and enhance formal donor partnerships. Sharing costs and 
expertise at regional and District level can be improved by regulation, building on 
regional partnerships and engaging NGOs and the private sector (for example, 
Kenya’s Special Projects). Institutional capacity building and collaborative projects 
increase awareness of international funding and strengthen links to development 
banks and donor agencies.  The Global Environment Facility has been used to address 




Case G. The challenge of multisectoral coordination to overcome drought and 
floods in Malawi 
 
Inappropriate government policies have increased vulnerability and undermined 
attempts to adapt in Malawi. Food security is defined largely by the availability of 
maize and policies to intensify production have been encouraged. The rapid 
economic growth after 1964 was based on unsustainable development policy and 
rapid economic liberalisation did not address the underlying structural problems to 
poverty. For example, the loss of agricultural subsidies to farmers in 1994 and the 
privatisation of seed companies increased the costs of short-season hybrid maize 
seed and fertilisers. However, less capital-intensive local varieties have become 
generally unavailable now, which favours commercial farmers over poor smallholder 
farmers.  
 
The impacts of climate change in Malawi exposes these underlying causes of food 
insecurity. For example, without livelihood alternatives, there are often inappropriate 
land use practice and deforestation, exacerbating drought and localised flooding. 
Weak enforcement of Malawi’s forestry laws has led to local rights abuses by 
powerful tobacco estates that clear indigenous forests. The government ideal of 
agricultural commercialisation as a route to development has failed the poor. For 
example in 2004, Malawi was at the edge of an abyss with a collapse in the national 
economy and an absence of productivity enhancing measures for smallholder 
agriculture. Increasingly large numbers of people forced to move because of poverty 
and regular flooding of their farms are now seeking employment on small-scale 
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increasing negative social consequences. 
 
Existing local government capacity cannot currently support the challenges 
smallholder farmers face in adapting to climate change. Local government is limited 
by support for the formulation of policies, a lack of knowledge of disaster and 
environmental management policies, a serious lack in funding, capacity building and 
implementation advice. Development and adaptation to climate change remain 
addressed as separate issues by the government and there is a lack of intersectoral 
coordination for the implementation of climate-related activities. Planning and 
management of climate change and disaster management is currently carried out on 
a sectoral basis, with limited involvement from local communities. This will ultimately 
hamper effective development and capacity to adapt to future impacts of climate 
change. The National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) for Malawi is the 
central guide to adaptation priorities and a priority for the water sector to ensure 
community resilience is given in section 2. However, the NAPA exists in isolation to 
policies being developed in agriculture and environment for example, and NGOs 
have raised concerns that health and gender, as well as district priorities, have been 
ignored.  
 
It is imperative that a multi-sectoral governance approach is developed in Malawi, 
and that those who are affected most by climate change are included in this process. 
However, the roots of poverty are grounded in the very nature of political and social 
order and limited progress in constructing a ‘developmental state’ in Malawi. While 
this has brought benefits to the middle classes, democratisation has not brought 
rapid benefits to the poor. This partly because policies have not been pursued 
consistently and partly because the private sector has not been encouraged. 
Moreover, society in rural Malawi finds unity and collectivism in the value system an 
appealing way to cope with uncertainty, although social relationships are still 
characterised by inequality. Traditional attitudes are a barrier to entrepreneurial 
innovation.  
 
The lack of public policies to facilitate the large infrastructural investments that 
Malawi needs (such as roads, schools, healthcare, energy and water supply and 
agricultural extension services), means that local entrepreneurs prefer turnover in 
the service sector and there are few foreign investors in the sectors that would 
support the poor. Recent political realignment and a new president offer a window of 
opportunity to promote more developmentally-oriented policies and procedures that 
give consideration to climate change risks. It is critical that these barriers are 
overcome and the opportunities as described in section 2 acted upon. There needs 
to be greater decentralisation, better use of local staff and less implementation of 




The Malawi case example describes a quite different picture to Kenya, with less 
progress in integration. Malawi needs to reduce vulnerability to climate change by 
increasing awareness, ability of the poor to access technologies and improve practical 
action on developing flexible economic livelihood opportunities. For example, 
poverty is a major cause of deforestation in the drylands with 90% of the population 
dependent on wood fuel. Deforestation has negative feedbacks on land use cover, the 
rural economy and causes sedimentation in waterways. Yet, there are limited funds to 
implement policy and land allocation to the rural poor and reforms are slow. 
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adaptive pathways for the rural poor, in particular those that build on existing service 
delivery mechanisms and policy proposals in the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy 
plan. The plan focuses on improved resource management, technological 
advancement, and social and economic development. Based on pro-poor growth, 
human capital development, improvement of quality of life and good governance 
rules, the government has prioritised basic infrastructure, such as sanitation, roads, 
dams, electrification and schools (although it is unlikely the costs will be met). It is 
also important that District authorities enforce ‘no development’ in areas vulnerable 
to regular floods and mudslides. 
 
In addition, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan sets money aside for ‘social safety 
nets’, which ensure that poor households can rebuild their livelihood assets after a 
disaster and not become trapped in a cycle of vulnerability. Contingencies will need 
to be included for climatic variability and diversification encouraged. It is essential 
that there is better integration between the national adaptation plan and government 
development sector-specific objectives, perhaps by focusing on specific themed 
issues that cut across different sectors (e.g. in energy). The Malawi adaptation plan 
has a strong agricultural focus, with specific actions to improve dissemination of 
information (e.g. improved crop/agroforestry varieties, and livestock breeds, which 
are drought and pest resistant), build communities grain storage and enhance food 
distribution. These initiatives aim to build on existing local knowledge (e.g. promote 
the inclusion of faidherbia albida, a tree that sheds leaves during rainy season 
releasing nutrients and allowing crops to grown under its canopy). Reduced 
corruption would increase funds towards these extension services, with mechanisms 
for climate information access and better services to rural areas. Their value is 
demonstrated by the increased agricultural production where input services have 
risen, even in areas that were previously declining. 
 
What general lessons can be learned from the case examples?  
 
Overall, the assessment of climate change adaptation, disaster risk management and 
poverty reduction integration in Kenya and Malawi suggests that the climate change 
community has failed to leverage adaptation yet in a way that takes on the 
fundamentals of poverty and politics. The risks of climate change must be 
communicated as a development issue, in development terms and with clear analysis 
of the economic implications of climate related risks on development processes. 
There are some general lessons to be concluded about the constraints and mechanisms 
for integration that could enhance adaptation to climate change. 
 
Existing constraints to integration are primarily in areas of identification of risk and 
communication of the impacts, the coordination between different parts of 
government and limited funds to turn policy into practice. For example, inadequate 
provision of high-resolution meteorological data for detecting trends and validating 
models in Kenya means that there is insufficient incorporation of the implications of 
climate change in risk assessments.  In Malawi, limited physical (e.g. hydrological) 
and socioeconomic datasets for assessing risk limits the identification of practical 
adaptation options and understanding of future risk.  In Malawi in particular, there 
was weak coordination mechanisms regarding climate change adaptation, under-
development of a preventive, disaster risk reduction approach and discontinuity in 
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climate change adaptation are fragmented institutionally and these tend to be donor-
driven. Disaster emergency response also continues to divert funds away from the 
local development agenda. 
 
A number of mechanisms and incentives to act as entry points for integration can be 
seen in both case examples. Improving the science base for forecasting and modelling 
climatic conditions at different spatial and temporal scales can be used to relate 
hazard information to vulnerability factors. The structural changes in Kenya illustrate 
how improved procedures for hazard diagnosis and risk assessment and the regular 
updating of disaster risk assessment and management guidelines provides flexibility 
over time.  Building on existing coordination structures will enhance communication 
between science and users, both at the nation level by capturing political momentum 
after major disaster events or community project activities that focus on addressing 
underlying vulnerability. While there is not one solution for these problems, 
providing alternative livelihoods and coordinated structure has been central to 
successful dryland projects (e.g. Kenya attracted funding for long-term risk 
management in the Arid Land Resources Management Project, while the dryland 
Omayed Biosphere Reserve in Egypt now supports pastoral practice). 
 
Integration can support improved governance and infrastructural prioritisation. The 
complexity and multiscale character of climate change requires hybrid modes of 
governance across the state-market-community division. Multiscale governance 
mechanisms can counter the fragmentation that is characteristic of sectorally based 
decision-making, or indeed of decision making that is organised by territorial, social 
and political divisions. The involvement of public-private networks in multi-scale 
governance is aimed to enhance the representation of the diversity of interests that 
may be affected by climate change (e.g. within the political process of agricultural 
governance in Brazil or water regulation for Mexico City). At the same time, 
integrated strategies are conducive to compromise-seeking and social learning, often 
enabling less formal modes of decision-making, greater transparency and higher 
levels of representation. Hybrid forms are complementary to the dynamic and fast 
changing nature of contemporary environmental governance in developing countries.  
 
Moreover, building adaptive capacity is hardly a new development approach but 
should be treated holistically. Interventions that consider climate risk can build on 
existing policies that consider risks to livelihoods and be embedded in existing 
delivery systems. Climate change adaptation should be grounded within a concern for 
vulnerability reduction, which brings multiple benefits. It is important to offer 
convincing demonstrations of on-the-ground livelihood activities, especially where 
single development pathways have been counter-productive to marginal livelihoods. 
For example, in Egypt approaches for managing dryland biosphere reserves provide 
opportunities for local communities to develop integrated technologies and alternative 
livelihoods whilst still maintaining their cultural and societal fabric.
53
 
Cross-scale governance mechanisms are often shaped by non-state actors, such as 
NGOs, transnational organisations, multi lateral organisations, intergovernmental 
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  30organisations or market-oriented actors (e.g. companies). The reconfiguration of 
environmental governance so that the state is no longer the only actor viewed as 
capable of addressing externalities has enormous implications for adaptation and 
development. The promotion of individual incentives, new property rights and 
markets in relation to water and carbon, and encouragement for the corporate sector 
need to be carefully implemented to ensure they do not have negative impacts on the 
poor or increase inequality in the allocation of environmental resources. For example, 
those who are able to access resources and expertise in relation to these new 
opportunities will be more likely to derive benefits from them. The commodification 
of nature and increasing intergenerational equity should also raise concern. As 
redistributive policy making becomes necessary (i.e. for adaptation) it is unlikely that 
either the market or hybrid forms of governance will be enough to accomplish it. This 
raises a number of questions. How should we rethink governance structures for 
integration and how will these alter development frameworks? Can practical 
recommendations for integrating adaptation into wider strategies for human 
development be organised into practical actions? Strategic frameworks for integrating 
adaptation currently tend to focus on (1) understanding current vulnerability-
livelihood interactions and how the poor already build resilience through current 
capabilities (2) the barriers and enabling factors that have facilitated implementation 
of adaptive measures (3) the institutional processes through which adaptation 
measures can be implemented and (4) how climate change adaptation strategy can 
complement development policy. The follow sections offer specific policy points that 
highlight mechanisms by which adaptation concerns could be integrated more 
effectively to ensure sustainable development outcomes.  
 
Invest in ‘boundary institutions’ that help to bring climate information to bear on 
sectoral planning and decision making 
 
These institutions can act as intermediaries between scientists and sectoral managers, 
‘translating’ knowledge into practical guidance for the organisations that wield 
decision-making authority and can help clarify the needs of decision makers. For 
example, in Kenya measures to integrated the Food Security Structure with longer 
term livelihood planning. It is important to strengthen services that can package and 
translate scientific data. Emphasis should be placed on training professionals, relating 
scientific information on risk, vulnerability and adaptation options in a form that is 
accessible and meaningful to decision-makers especially in key sectors such as health, 
climate forecasting, agriculture and water. Budget provision could be directed toward 
training in-house staff or toward building the services of institutions that already have 
expertise to filter hazard data and turn it into useful information. For example, 
creating forums for communication at the local level will strengthen the integration of 
climate information and advice on adaptive measures into local contexts and build 
trust in external information. This may be fostered by development of skills and 
capacities at the local level, including systems of training of ‘trainers’ or ‘para-
extensionists’ to interpret risk information. The Kenya Arid Land Resources 
Management Project advises District Steering Groups and provides support to 
Agricultural and Pastoral Extensions Services.  
 
Invest in improving information on climate, models and vulnerability  
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meteorological observations. There is a need to increase policy level awareness of the 
importance of continuous climate data records for risk evaluation and prevention, and 
strengthen support for improved climatic data coverage across space and time, and 
regular updating and monitoring. However, in many cases, the problem is not lack of 
data but problems of securing access to global, regional or national datasets, 
especially for independent scientists and local stakeholders. Efforts should be made to 
reduce barriers to utilization of existing datasets. At the same time, consideration 
should be given to assessing and, where appropriate, utilizing alternative data sources, 
such as local and traditional knowledge, which can provide initial insights into 
(changing) hazard exposure and conditions of vulnerability. Many of these needs can 
be overcome by collaboration (e.g. through the development regional climate science 
networks in East Africa). Likewise, collaboration can help to build capacity in and 
between developing countries, in order to model long-term climate changes and 
downscaling output.  
 
Output must be oriented towards achieving development outcomes, even by 
meteorological services. Risk is not just an outcome of physical climate/hazard 
processes; risk is the combined product of physical exposure to hazards and social 
vulnerability (i.e. characteristics of people and society that shape human 
vulnerability). In order to understand the character and dynamics of risk, there is a 
need to create opportunities for better integration of physical and socioeconomic data, 
including information relating to population vulnerability, sectoral economic risk and 
critical infrastructure, and awareness of trends that affect vulnerability over time. 
Risk is also likely to vary greatly from place to place and better location-specific 
analysis would capture the context-specific dynamics of risk under a changing 
climate. This would improve decision making, especially for smallscale farmers, as in 
Mali. It would also support sustainable land use planning, a critical requirement for 
an adaptation tool in vulnerable urban areas.  
 
Identifying appropriate adaptation options requires a consideration of risk over 
different timescales. Risk management strategies will vary by activity and livelihood 
sector thus making flexibility central to approach. For example, planting practices can 
change from season to season, but shifts in crop cultivation also require appropriate 
market access and change in human behaviour, which require longer-term 
preparations and multiple livelihood support. The success of the Arid Land Resources 
Management Project and Livestock Services in Kenya now offers a model for dryland 
action. Risk assessment tools that work over different timescales should be targeted at 
or used to identify key sectors for investment, such as the water sector in drought-
affected areas. The tools that work best tend to be demand-driven and shaped by user 
needs. 
 
Encourage institutional innovation and coordination 
 
There are already centres of excellence in developing countries that can play a key 
role in sharing knowledge. While solutions will differ by country and cultural setting, 
it is important that institutional arrangements are put in place that enable networks 
and partnerships to develop and implement innovative, problem-focused climate risk 
management programmes. There is a need to strengthen and develop multi-sectoral 
structures and networks that improve awareness of disaster risk and climate change 
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existing institutions and networks, rather than seeking to create new ones.  
 
Coordination and integration should ensure feedback between national and local 
activities. At an international scale, the strengthening of regional partnerships can 
enhance political momentum for national coordination. For example in helping to 
improve structures that are mandated to provide long-term planning oversight and 
consider changes in risk exposure over time. Political leadership is a characteristic of 
lasting momentum towards integration of adaptation and development. Prioritisation 
will require a strengthening of incentives for integrating risk management 
perspectives into economic planning and development policies, especially through 
better regulation. Mechanisms for promoting mainstreaming of adaptation and 
disaster risk reduction across policy in the long-term will vary according to 
political/institutional context. At the national level, it may be important to identify a 
clear leader on disaster and climate risk management efforts with influence on 
budgeting and planning processes to increase emphasis on a continuous approach to 
vulnerability reduction. In many cases, this falls within different Ministries so it is 
necessary to use National Platforms to facilitate this process. It is important that 
Ministries responsible for budgetary allocation are involved in the process of 
mainstreaming (as now recognised in Kenya). 
 
Strengthen local level capacity to initiate and implement adaptive measures 
 
Largely, policy work exploring the human dimensions of climate change has tended 
to be donor-driven, and work is needed to build the capacity of both local authorities 
and communities to initiate and implement adaptive measures. However, it is 
important to evaluate critically the applicability of local knowledge in the context 
both of development aspirations and of long-term changes in hazard intensity. 
Promoting systematic knowledge sharing to identify priorities, promote the rapid and 
effective uptake of innovative practices, technologies and results will help strengthen 
the sustainability of projects that tackle long-term goals and avoid exclusion of the 
needs and priorities of marginal groups.  
 
At the local level, climate risks are experienced as a product of climate variability. 
Climate change introduces a trend that is superimposed on this natural variability, 
leading to changes in average climatic conditions and exposure to extreme events over 
time. Given that climate risks interact with other environmental and socioeconomic 
risk factors, it is crucial that efforts at the local level focus on addressing the current 
adaptation deficit to climate variability, as well as climatic trends that are already 
having an impact. In this context, there is a question as to when climate change 
concerns should be introduced as an additional or separate issue at the local scale. The 
challenge for overarching policy interventions and planning processes (especially the 
focus on ‘adaptation projects’) lies in helping communities and households to address 
current climate risks, while avoiding solutions that become maladaptive in the 
medium to long-run. In most cases, attention to climate change risks in practical 
projects on the ground cannot take too narrow an approach if it to lead to actions that 
are truly sustainable in a development context. Underpinning this view is the belief 
that promoting livelihood resilience will be a fundamental advance toward adaptation 
for low-income populations. Linkage of climate change adaptation, disaster risk 
management and poverty reduction may be put into practice most effectively in 
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themes on issues such as water resources and climate change, or dryland livelihood 
development, can bring a range of different stakeholders and institutions together.  
Reducing poverty and inequality through increased development assistance will help 




Identifying entry points for adaptation  
 
A key step is to demonstrate, through operational work, that disaster risk reduction 
addressing climate change is possible and beneficial. In this respect, it is important to 
find potential ‘entry points’ that can showcase both how action is feasible, building 
on current capacity, and how benefits can be linked to current vulnerabilities and to 
high-level policy goals, such as poverty reduction strategy targets and the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The Hyogo Framework for Action, adopted at the 
World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Japan 2005, offers comprehensive 
disaster reduction policies that should be implemented at local and national levels as 
an urgent adaptation measure. NAPAs for developing countries can also be used to 
identify priorities for investment. The next step is to quantify the economic impact of 




3.3 Stakeholder responsibility and mechanisms to fund adaptation 
 
The development community makes assessments based on ideals from different 
actors. There is a need to clarify such perspectives; where does information come 
from and how does it get used? We should careful of displacing local perspectives 
with technological and bureaucratic constructions. There needs to be more effort to 
build institutional capacity in developing countries in order to rebuke false notions 
and promote south-south exchange. Where ideas come from has implications for 
development pathways. There is a role for the oversight offered by donor agencies 
because those who are adapting, especially at a local level, cannot always prioritise 
outside their own individual experience. However, there is a need to understand better 
the choices over different timescales and by different geographical regions. These 
differences go to the heart of the divide between the policy community, who need to 
make decisions for the near-future, and the climate science community, which urges 
caution about decisions based on current uncertainty and which may lead to ‘mal-
adaptations’ or future ‘dangerous development’. In reality, it is clear that there are 
lessons that we can learn now from local level case studies. Intuitive decisions should 
be supported to improve risk management frameworks for the poor today. 
 
The cross-scale nature of the climate change problem is the central challenge for 
donor and NGO approaches. Is society inherently resilient and able to adapt, or do the 
impacts of climate change mean that we need to scale up our thinking beyond 
traditional development approaches? We should not over-emphasise adaptive society 
because the impacts of climate change may mean that thresholds beyond which 
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in a sensitive manner. The question is then how to scale our responsibility up to reach 
the millions of communities necessary in the next ten years? Donors would agree that 
there is a need to find ways of energizing behavioural change through the good use of 
climate information for development decision-making at all scales. This will require 
greater rural extension, capacity building and communication efforts. 
 
High-level policy dialogue can complement bottom-up approaches within countries, 
giving greater visibility to in-country expertise. Given that increasingly development 
assistance is channelled through programme budgets rather than individual projects, 
the role of donor agencies in the dialogue on climate risk management has to be 
considered. Donors will continue to use existing policy mechanisms to facilitate 
policy windows and forums for discussion (e.g. for national government plans and 
reforms, such as Poverty Reduction Strategies, NAPAs, the UNFCCC process, or 
National Platforms). However, the use of conditionalities by donors in order to 
promote, often complex, reforms can generate nominal compliance. There is a need 
for better interaction between government and donors. Development policy and 
advocacy has not been consistent through time or across the donor community. This is 
especially the case in agriculture, where individual donor agencies have changed their 
approach and advocacy messages. Short-termism, competitiveness and politics 
characterise donor approaches as much as governments. There are three 
responsibilities to consider: 
  
1.  Improved continuity and engagement are vital for long-term change, based on 
an understanding of the local political economy. Proactive engagement by donor 
advisory staff in identifying the specific issues on which incremental changes in 
incentives for change exist are critical. Whilst developing countries need to 
prioritise and implement their National Adaptation Programmes of Action, 
international donor agencies need to assess the extent to which their investment 
portfolios in developing countries might be at risk due to climate change and take 
steps to reduce that risk. Many donor agencies are developing risk-screening tools.  
 
2.  It may be easy to be cynical about new aid policy agendas around adaptation and 
development (e.g. building country policy ownership, aligning programmes with 
PRSPs, adopting programme modalities such as SWAps and budget support) but 
the case study evidence suggests that they have made some progress. For example, 
Special Projects and Food Security Structures in Kenya are funded by donors but 
managed by national government. Aid harmonisation, informed by joint 
agreement on donor response in each country, needs to be addressed but this again 
reflects the scale of action. For example, a co-ordinated effort on a continental 
scale might alter the incentive structure facing the leaders of individual countries 
in a way that donor action at the country level cannot. It is also worth 
distinguishing traditional programme aid with objectives linked to specific 
projects (e.g. GEF) or macro-economic stabilization and directly related policy 
reform, and new-style direct budget support viewed as a means of financing the 
implementation of a PRSP and enhancing relevant government capacity. 
Increasing policy ownership requires identifying viable entry points for these new 
agendas within the structural determinants of the weak policy capacity of a state. 
 
3.  Flexibility - the need for an approach that includes learning, where incentives to 
use information are built-in and programme designs allow low-cost switching of 
method or components when initial assumptions are called into questions. This 
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climate change. 
 
The boxes below outline two examples from donor agencies to illustrate their attitude 
towards these three responsibilities and perspectives towards integration and policy 
collaboration. 
 
The UK Department for International Development is increasing its capacity to 
address climate change; the UK White Paper 3/G8 describes a new priority for 
climate change. DFID will also complete climate risk analyses for six major aid 
recipients in 2007 (Bangladesh, China, India, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Ghana). More 
generally, the 2002 Monterrey meeting of world leaders led to the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Coordination and an ‘un-tying of aid’, which has facilitated better 
coordination between donors. Major new promises at Gleneagles suggest increases to 
ODA of $50 billion by 2010 (above $107 billion in 2005) and further EU15 promises 
raising it to $66 billion by 2015. National Development Plans are central to how ODA 
funds are distributed and therefore policy priorities can be driven by recipient 
countries. DFID sees adaptation as a long-term investment. First, improving 
information, identifying risk and establishing the conditions for individuals to act 
(including regulatory frameworks).  Second, adaptation will include “targeted 
resilience-building” through measures like domestic spending for ODA, prices, and 
investments. There has been a recent shift in offering more fundamental support for 
national budgets, especially for building governance capacity and flexible structures, 
although half the spending is made through the EU. “Pure adaptation measures” can 
only be a small fraction of total livelihood adaptation, although operational definitions 
are unclear about what will be ‘good’. Examples of adaptive approaches to 
development will continue inform future development planning, however, these will 
need to demonstrate the added development value and impact to operations, in order 
to create the right development architecture. There is also an increasing effort to 
ensure that sections of DFID that support disaster risk management and those that 
focus on adaptation find collaboration opportunities.  
 
From 1984 to 2005, the World Bank spent $26 billion to rebuild after disasters. The 
value of an integrated risk and natural disasters approach is that disasters expose 
existing adaptation deficits, in particular, the failure of development planning to 
address long-term adaptation to risks and climate change. The costs of adaptation may 
be higher and impact on any development reform the Bank funds. There is an 
economic case for funding preventative adaptation efforts and the World Bank has 
been involved in awareness raising, the development of new concepts and methods, 
and the funding of pilot projects experimenting with adaptation interventions, as well 
as mechanisms for mainstreaming these strategies. In particular, there has been a 
focus on poverty reduction and new investment frameworks, which in 2006 included 
the consideration of climate risks in the energy sector planning for the first time. Risk 
Screening Tools, the development of process indicators and the shift in funding 
towards support for adaptation to climate change has allowed country-level efforts in 
the Caribbean, Columbia, the Andes, Kiribati, and Africa. Recent funding has focused 
on integrated pilot projects that deal with the impacts of climate change on rural 
livelihoods in a holistic way (e.g. the Arid Land Resources Management Project in 
Kenya). 
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Funding for adaptation and development interventions are vastly insufficient to 
address the scale of the problem. Costs are uncertain, but may range from US$9-40 
billion a year, merely to address current investments.  It is politically very unlikely 
that bilateral donations could ever generate the sort of money needed to cover the cost 
of adaptation in developing countries. To value adaptation, a financial/business case 
for adaptation in national budgets must be highlighted. Planning and Finance 
Ministries need to be explicitly involved in this process rather than priorities made by 
environmental ministries. Financial incentives need to be improved for disaster risk 
prevention as a complement to emergency relief. Arguably, demonstration of the cost 
effectiveness of adaptation is a prerequisite for concerted action and investment. 
Improvement is therefore needed in the tools for evaluation and the ability to direct 
funds available in national budgets for preventive and adaptive aspects of disaster risk 
management. Application of tools such as cost-benefit analysis to evaluate activities 
with long-term and complex social benefits is problematic because it is difficult to 
cost cultural benefits that may increase inherent adaptive capacity in the future. This 
is a specific area of further research and pilot studies are needed to test the 
applicability of these and related methodologies.  
 
There is a clear distinction between ODA and international transactions, and a need 
for educating developing countries on where and how to get international funds, 
especially given inequity in power and capacity between LDCs. The balance in power 
over who is responsible for mainstreaming decisions must be considered more 
honestly. There are a variety of financing sources, including the funds of the 
UNFCCC and trust funds of donor agencies.  There are four funds under the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: the Special 
Climate Change Fund, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and 
the Adaptation Trust Fund, which total about $200 million total. The history of aid 
suggests that national budgets will not be a reliable and adequate source of funding 
for adaptation to climate change. As a result, these funds have begun to engage with 
ideas of international tax, but may need to go further. Funding adaptation is no 
different from development planning, and may be more urgent. Yet at a national level, 
developing countries that are more powerful are successfully capturing the vast 
majority of development aid, CDM projects, and adaptation aid. Improving this 
inequity requires an informed understanding of the geopolitics of aid and international 
negotiations over climate and trade. 
 
The Adaptation Fund of the United Nations (UN) Climate Change regime is in many 
ways unique. It is outside the direct sphere of influence of countries, specifically the 
United States. It is able to generate money through a two-percent levy on the emission 
permits (‘Certified Emission Reductions’ CERs) generated by emission reduction 
projects under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism. These projects 
are carried out in developing countries predominantly by private sector investors, and 
the 2 percent share of the CERs generated by the projects is to be collected directly by 
an intergovernmental agency (the CDM Executive Board) and monetized by the 
Adaptation Fund. In other words, it is in essence an international private sector tax, 
which could set a future precedent. The revenue generated until 2012 is projected to 
be between $160m to $950m, while the funding presently given to or pledged by 
donor countries to the other two climate change funds is around $170m. Alternative 
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developing countries. As a financial instrument dedicated to specific adaptation 
activities, measures will need to be put in place to assess eligibility and legitimacy of 
project applications.
55  But who will define this? And can the fund deliver the dual 
needs of development: funding for general development assistance to reduce 
vulnerability through budget support and funding for specific adaptation projects and 
risk spreading financial arrangements? If funding is provided for specific projects, and 
not poverty reduction and livelihood development would the adaptation be 
sustainable? Resolving the threats associated with one hazard will not necessarily help 
vulnerable groups over come lack of basic entitlements. 
 
In general, it has to be recognized that public sector financing will not suffice to 
reduce vulnerability to disaster and climate risks. Foreign direct investments often 
dwarf official development assistance and it is important to explore how the private 
sector can engage in adaptation mechanisms. It is important that governments develop 
policies to promote private sector investment in adaptive projects and influence 
development practices through improved awareness, incentives and regulation. For 
example, considering the role of risk transfer and credit schemes in buffering against 
climate risks as is being piloted in Ethiopia. In this context, insurance products, 
especially weather index insurance systems (e.g. providing payments during drought), 
can play a viable role if tied to efforts aimed at vulnerability reduction. Donors can 
play a role in helping governments think beyond aid by capacity building within 
Ministries. Governments will need to consider new financial instruments such as 
weather derivatives, weather market capacity securitisation or reinsurance. The 
private sector could also usefully engage with government at different scales to 
achieve provide advice and support in developing countries
56. There are questions 
about whether funds to private sector will be supporting adaptation that would have 
occurred anyway, and that early adaptors will accrue private benefits from their 
preventative actions? However, these questions emphasise the need to consider 
options at multiple scales. 
                                                 
55 For example, Saudi Arabia, in a recent submission to the UNFCCC Secretariat, Saudi Arabia, claims 
that “all the detailed activities and programs being developed under the five-year work program for 
adaptation represent concrete actions that should take priority for funding,” and, in particular that 
funding is needed for the theme of economic diversification sub-theme addressed within the five-year 
programme of work in order to: “improve the quality of models, in particular those that assess the 
adverse impacts on social and economic development as consequence of the responses to climate 
change, taken into full account the legitimate priority needs of developing countries with specific 
emphasis on countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the 
production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-
intensive products.”[FCCC/SBI/2006/MISC.7 Views on specific policies, programme priorities and 
eligibility criteria and possible arrangements for the management of the Adaptation Fund: Submissions 
from Parties] 
56 Hultman NE and Bozmoski AS 2006 The changing face of normal disaster: risk, resilience and 
national security in a changing climate, Journal of International Affairs 59 (2): 25-41. 
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